Paved With Good Intentions: How InterLATA Data Relief Undermines the Competitive Provisions of the 1996 Act by Walker, Jean F.
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 53 | Issue 3 Article 6
5-2001
Paved With Good Intentions: How InterLATA
Data Relief Undermines the Competitive
Provisions of the 1996 Act
Jean F. Walker
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Communications Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walker, Jean F. (2001) "Paved With Good Intentions: How InterLATA Data Relief Undermines the Competitive Provisions of the
1996 Act," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 53: Iss. 3, Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol53/iss3/6
Paved With Good Intentions:
How InterLATA Data Relief
Undermines the Competitive
Provisions of the 1996 Act
Jean F. Walker*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 534
II. THE HISTORY OF THE BELL OPERATING COMPANIES .................. 535
A . B O Cs ................................................................................. 537
B. LA TAs ................................................................................ 537
I1. THE ROLE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 ............ 538
A. ILECs and CLECs .............................................................. 539
B. Section 251 ......................................................................... 540
C. Section 271 ......................................................................... 542
1. Track A or Track B ......................................................... 542
2. The 14-Point Checklist ................................................... 543
3. Separate Affiliate ............................................................ 543
4. The Public Interest, Convenience, and Necessity ............. 543
IV. THE "DIGITAL DIVIDE" .......................................................... 544
V. H.R. 1542: INTERNET FREEDOM AND BROADBAND
DEPLOYMENT ACT OF 2001 ........................................................ 545
VI. CURRENT ALTERNATIVES TO CHANGING THE LAW ..................... 547
* B.B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998; Candidate for J.D., Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington, 2001. Upon graduation, Ms. Walker will join
Blumenfeld & Cohen, Technology Law Group, in Washington, D.C. Ms. Walker wishes to
thank Professor Fred H. Cate, William W. Benz, Christy C. Kunin, and especially Jeremy D.
Marcus for their valuable comments on this Note. Ms. Walker would also like to thank her
wonderful family and friends for their love, support, and inspiration.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
A . Section 271 ......................................................................... 547
B. Application for LATA Boundary Modification or Waiver .... 548
C. Other Technologies ............................................................ 550
VII. WORKING THE SYSTEM: WHY H.R. 1542 Is HARMFUL TO
C ONSUM ERS ............................................................................... 551
A. Such Legislation Is Not Tailored to the Problem of the
D igital D ivide ..................................................................... 551
B. InterLATA Relieffor Data Services Is No Small Prize ......... 552
C. The Technological Environment Prior to the 1996 Act ........ 553
D. H.R. 1542 Undermines the "Delicate
Balance" of the 1996 Act: It Is Too Soon for Total
Deregulation of Data Services ............................................ 553
E. The False Premise that H.R. 1542 Amends the 1996 Act to
Account for the Internet ...................................................... 554
V III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 555
I. INTRODUCTION
Just over five years ago, former President Clinton signed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") into law, effectively
opening long-shut doors to competition.' Today, Congress faces the
question whether to close those doors once again. H.R. 1542, the "Internet
Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001," seeks to provide Bell
Operating Companies ("BOCs") with interLATA relief for the provision of
data services. This allows BOCs to provide data services across the LATA
boundaries that have restrained them for the nearly two decades since the
breakup of AT&T, without complying with the competitive provisions of
the 1996 Act. H.R. 1542 aims to lift limitations on "consumer choice and
welfare"'2 and to "bridge" the "digital divide." 3 The newly introduced H.R.
1542 takes the place of its identical twin from the 106th Congress, H.R.
2420.4 This Note illustrates how legislative initiatives like H.R. 1542 not
only will fail their essential purpose, but also will harm the consumer
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001, H.R. 1542, 107th Cong.
§ 2(a)(6) (2001).
3. See discussion infra Part V.
4. Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001: Hearing of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, 107th Cong., Fed'l News Serv., Apr. 25, 2001, LEXIS,
FedNew File [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1542] (statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin) ("In
1999, we introduced H.R. 2420, which was the identical bill we refiled again yesterday.").
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choice and welfare they claim to protect.
As the market moves toward convergence among and within
telecommunications industries, legislators evaluating H.R. 1542 must
remember the purpose underlying AT&T's divestiture and the subsequent
competitive provisions of the 1996 Act: "Free and open competition brings
about the lowest possible prices and the mix of services that is most closely
aligned with consumers' preferences."' Until the local exchange markets
are open to robust competition, some regulation must remain in place to
afford more choice and lower prices to consumers. If enacted, H.R. 1542
will destroy consumer choice and raise prices by toppling the painstakingly
constructed balance struck by the 1996 Act.
In the past few decades, the climate has transformed for
telecommunications companies from unification to fragmentation and back
again. Part I of this Note discusses the beginning of this cycle, the
divestiture of AT&T, which imposed the original restrictions on BOCs with
respect to the provision of interLATA service. Part II describes the
competitive provisions of the 1996 Act, which replaced the twelve-year-old
6
restrictions imposed by the divestiture of AT&T. In light of this history,
H.R. 1542 attempts to solve the problem of the digital divide by providing
expansive interLATA relief for data services. Part IV examines the
problem of the digital divide, and Part V provides the background of H.R.
1542. As this Note will show, several feasible solutions superior to H.R.
1542 already exist to address the same problem. Part VI discusses
alternatives to changing the current law and why these alternatives are far
better than H.R. 1542's heavy-handed solution. Part VII argues that the
critical shortcoming of H.R. 1542 is not that it represents an ill-fitting,
duplicative solution to the problem of the digital divide, but rather that it
will harm consumers in rural and urban areas by eliminating choice and
raising prices.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE BELL OPERATING COMPANIES
To properly understand the debate surrounding this type of
5. David M. Mandy, Progress and Regress on InterLATA Competition, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 321, 343 (1999).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
Any conduct or activity that was, before the date of enactment of this Act [Feb. 8,
1996], subject to any restriction or obligation imposed by the AT&T Consent
Decree shall, on and after such date, be subject to the restrictions and obligations
imposed by the Communications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. [§] 151 et seq.] as
amended by this Act and shall not be subject to the restrictions and the obligations
imposed by such Consent Decree.
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legislation, one must understand the terminology and law that arose out of
the divestiture of AT&T. The entrance of MCI and other companies into
the long-distance market in the 1970s first foreshadowed a potential
antitrust action against AT&T.7 Despite competition from MCI and others,
AT&T still commanded about eighty percent of the long-distance market in
8the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Justice Department ("DOJ") leveled
an antitrust suit against AT&T in 1974,9 because "in the absence of
restrictions on their ability to enter new lines of business, the BOCs would
cross-subsidize competitive services with their monopolized local services,
and would discriminate against competing long-distance companies when
providing the connection to the local network."'
On January 15, 1981, proceedings commenced before Judge Harold
Greene in the DOJ's case to break up AT&T's monopoly." Cross-
subsidization and other monopolistic tactics formed the impetus behind the
divestiture: "[A]s long as local exchange service providers were allowed to
sell long-distance service, competition in long-distance service could not be
free and open."' 2 On January 8, 1982, AT&T and the DOJ announced a
settlement to break up AT&T, which they called the Modified Final
Judgment ("MFJ" or "divestiture agreement"). 3 Almost two years later, on
7. Eric M. Swedenburg, Note, Promoting Competition in the Telecommunications
Markets: Why the FCC Should Adopt a Less Stringent Approach to Its Review of Section
271 Applications, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1418, 1426 (1999).
8. See Eli M. Noam, Federal and State Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects of
Deregulation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 949, 967 (1983) (estimating the share at 84.9%); United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 171 (D.D.C. 1982) (AT&T conceded that its share was
77% in 1981.), aff'dmem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
9. Swedenburg, supra note 7, at 1428.
10. Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the
Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417, 428 (1999).
11. STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 163 (1986);
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131.
12. Mandy, supra note 5, at 325.
13. COLL, supra note 11, at 359. See also ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP
39 (1991); ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 271-72 (1989). The
district court ratified this agreement on August 24, 1982, in the Modification of Final
Judgment, often confusingly referred to as the MFJ. Modification of Final Judgment, United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nom., Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). See also Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced
Telecomms. Capability, Request by Bell Atl.-W. Va. for Interim Relief Under Section 706,
or in the Alternative, a LATA Boundary Modification, Fourth Report and Order and
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 3089, para. 9, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 555
(2000) [hereinafter LATA Relief Order]. Judge Greene refused to refer to the original
agreement as the Modified Final Judgment "because the name was derived from the
maneuverings before Judge Biunno in New Jersey, which Greene never accepted as legal."
COLL, supra note 11, at 359.
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January 1, 1984, the divestiture agreement took effect.1 4 As part of that
agreement, LATAs and BOCs were born.'5
A. BOCs
The divestiture agreement separated the long-distance portion of
AT&T's business from its local service portion.' 6 Separate companies,
BOCs, were formed to provide local service. As part of the divestiture,
BOCs were grouped into seven, roughly equivalently sized, Regional Bell
Operating Companies ("RBOCs"). 7 The original seven have, through
mergers, now become four: SBC, Verizon, Qwest, and BellSouth.' Under
the terms of the divestiture, the BOCs were not allowed to manufacture
equipment or, more importantly, to provide long-distance service.' 9
B. LATAs
Prior to divestiture, BOCs had operated within geographically
designated areas.20 The divestiture agreement in U.S. v. AT&T further
fragmented these regions into local access and transport areas ("LATAs"). 2'
A LATA defines the area in which a BOC may offer local exchange
service. LATAs generally follow state boundaries, contain more area in
sparsely populated regions, and encompass the territory of only one
RBOC.2 Currently, 196 LATAs exist in North America.24
The MFJ prohibited BOCs from providing service across a LATA
boundary ("interLATA" service).5 "This limitation restricted the BOCs to
providing service only for calls originating and terminating within the same
14. COLL, supra note 11, at 362.
15. See id at268-81.
16. Id. at 270.
17. HARRY NEWTON, NEwTON's TELECOM DICTIONARY 740 (16th ed. 2000). These
seven companies included Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis
("PacTel"), Southwestern Bell, and U S West. Id
18. Southwestern Bell changed its name to SBC and merged with SNET and
Ameritech. Bell Atlantic merged with NYNEX and GTE and redubbed itself Verizon.
Finally, in the only case to date of a nonBOC taking over a BOC, Qwest took over U S
West. FCC, Common Carrier Bureau, Policy and Planning Division, Mergers of Common
Carriers Requiring FCC Approval, at http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/Mergers (last updated Sept.
27, 2000). Some fear these mergers indicate a trend toward remonopolization. Don't Let
Telecom Competition Vanish, Bus. WK., Apr. 23, 2001, at 130.
19. NEWTON, supra note 17, at 109.
20. Swedenburg, supra note 7, at 1428-29.
21. NEWTON, supra note 17, at 521-22.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. NEWTON, supra note 17, at 521-22.
25. Swedenburg, supra note 7, at 1428-29.
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LATA ("intraLATA" calls). These line-of-business restrictions constituted
the heart of the MFJ and dramatically changed the structure of the
telecommunications industry by forcing the BOCs out of the long-distance
market. 26 In February 1996, the competitive provisions of the 1996 Act
supplanted the authority of the MFJ.
27
III. THE ROLE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
The 1996 Act replaced the MFJ with sections 251, 252, and 271.
21
These sections immediately permitted some interLATA service, if such
service was provided outside the legacy region of a BOC.29 These sections
also provided the "carrot" of complete interLATA relief for a BOC if it
could prove to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") that it had complied with the market-opening provisions of
section 2510 The 1996 Act also arguably transferred jurisdiction over
LATA boundary questions from the district courts to the FCC.3' Certainly,
section 271 provided the Commission with the exclusive authority to
32determine whether a BOC could provide in-region interLATA service.
Taken together, sections 251, 252, and 271 comprise the competitive
provisions of the 1996 Act. 33 These sections provide a mechanism to open
the monopolistic local exchange market to competition. Section 251 sets
forth the obligations of incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") and
BOCs to share their facilities with competitors.34 Section 271 provides the
opportunity for BOCs to provide interLATA voice and data services by
satisfactorily opening their networks as required by section 251.31
26. Id.
27. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252, 271 (Supp. IV 1998).
28. Id. § 152(a)(1).
29. Id. § 271(b)(2). BOCs are free to provide out-of-region interLATA service without
the approval of the FCC: "A Bell operating company, or any affiliate of that Bell operating
company, may provide interLATA services originating outside its in-region States after
February 8, 1996, subject to subsection (j) of this section." Id "The term 'in-region State'
means a State in which a Bell operating company or any of its affiliates was authorized to
provide wire-line telephone exchange service pursuant to the reorganization plan approved
under the AT&T Consent Decree, as in effect on the day before February 8, 1996." Id §
271(i)(1).
30. Mandy, supra note 5, at 342 ("[Tlhe 'carrot' of permitting BOCs to serve
interLATA markets must be held out to provide incentives for BOCs to reduce barriers to
entry into the local exchange business.").
31. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(1), (e)(1), 153(25). See also LATA Relief Order, supra note
13, para. 9.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 27 1(d).
33. Id. §§ 251,271.
34. Id. § 251.
35. Id. §§ 251, 271(c).
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In return for stripping the BOCs of their local-service monopoly, the
1996 Act permits them to compete in the long-distance service
market-an area from which the prior regulatory scheme had banned
them.... Congress designed the 1996 Act to spark intense competition
in both the local and long-distance markets.
36
These competitive provisions form the "centerpiece" of the 1996
Act.37 The exclusion of the FCC's forbearance rights from the
implementation of these provisions illustrates the value Congress placed on
these provisions. "The FCC's privilege of 'regulatory flexibility' under the
1996 Act-a precious and hard-fought power to 'forbear' from enforcing
obsolete or unreasonable portions of its statutory mandate--does not
extend to the incumbent LEC provisions of section 251 or to section 271.,,38
The Commission's power to revoke its approval of a BOC's section 271
application, if it believes that a BOC is no longer complying with the
competitive requirements, also illustrates the force of these provisions.
A. ILECs and CLECs
An incumbent local exchange carrier is the dominant local exchange
provider within a geographic area.39 A BOC is always classified as an
ILEC, but an ILEC is not necessarily a BOC, because some ILECs, such as
GTE before it merged with Bell Atlantic, were the dominant local
providers in particular regions and existed before the 1996 Act, but were
not a part of the Bell system. The 1996 Act created a distinction between
ILECs and competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs")40 by setting out
special requirements for ILECs beyond those applicable to all local
exchange carriers in order to open the local exchange markets to
competition from CLECs.4' CLECs-local exchange providers established
after the enactment of the 1996 Act 2--will generally struggle to enforce
the market-opening provisions of the 1996 Act against an ILEC so that they
might compete freely in the local exchange market as the 1996 Act
36. Swedenburg, supra note 7, at 1420.
37. Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony's Deregulatory Shootout,
50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1576-77 (1999) ("Congress plainly intended the opening of the
local exchange to be the centerpiece of the Telecommunications Act.").
38. Id. at 1576-77 (referring to 47 U.S.C. § 160).
39. NEWTON, supra note 17, at 442.
40. Together, ILECs and CLECs are referred to as "LECs."
41. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) ("In addition to the duties contained in subsection (b) of this
section, each incumbent local exchange carrier has the following duties: [duty to negotiate,
interconnection, unbundled access, resale, notice of changes, and collocation.]").
42. NEWTON, supra note 17, at 193.
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envisioned.43
The 1996 Act contemplated three methods for CLECs to compete in
local markets. First, CLECs compete through "interconnection"--building
proprietary networks that they then "interconnect" to incumbents'
networks.44 This allows CLECs' customers to complete calls to and receive
calls from ILECs' customers. Both the CLEC and the ILEC may charge for
completing a call originating in the other's network-reciprocal
compensation.45 Second, CLECs may compete through "unbundling"-the
leasing of unbundled network elements ("UNEs"),46 the components of the
local network.47 A CLEC may lease these network elements from an ILEC
or other vendors or market participants to create its own network on a
piecemeal basis. 48 Finally, a CLEC may compete through the "resale" of
the ILEC's services.49 This means that the CLEC buys the ILEC's basic
services at wholesale prices and resells the services at retail prices to its
own customers under its own name, sometimes combining the resold
service with its own service. ° CLECs may also, and typically do, use a
combination of these three methods.
B. Section 251
Section 251 of the 1996 Act delineates the competitive obligations of
the various categories of telecommunications providers." Subsection (a)
announces the general requirement that every telecommunications carrier
must "interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment
of other telecommunications carriers. 52 Subsection (b) describes the
additional obligations of local exchange carriers. 3 A local exchange carrier
("LEC"), whether ILEC or CLEC, may not frustrate "the resale of its
43. This struggle is generally two-sided. As Mark Cooper, the research director of the
Consumer Federation of America, observed: "The biggest players have refused to open their
markets, refused to negotiate in good faith, litigated every nook and cranny of the law and
avoided head-to-head competition like the plague." William Glanz, 5-Year-Old Phone Act
Has Legacy on Hold, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at B7. "I believe the RBOCs have
frustrated and will continue to undermine competition at every juncture." Hearing on H.R.
1542, supra note 4 (statement of Joseph Gregori, CEO, InfoHighway Communications).
44. Hausman & Sidak, supra note 10, at 432.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. NEWTON, supra note 17, at 936.
48. Hausman & Sidak, supra note 10, at 432-33.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. IV 1998).
52. Id. § 251(a).
53. Id. § 251(b).
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telecommunications services;,'54 must provide number portability,55 dialing
parity s5 and access to rights-of-way;57 and must "establish reciprocal
compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of
telecommunications. 58
Subsection (c) sets out the specific requirements imposed only on
ILECs.5 9 An ILEC must allow interconnection to its existing local network
"at any technically feasible point, ' 60 unbundled access to its network
elements, 61 "resale at wholesale rates [for] any telecommunications service
that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not
,,62caorvrulcloain ftelecommunications carriers, and physical or virtual collocation of
facilities.63
"Section 251 was meant to spare CLECs the prohibitive expense of
building new LX [local exchange] networks from scratch." 64 Requiring a
telecommunications provider to create an entirely new network as its sole
means of providing competitive services not only creates an
insurmountable barrier to entry, but also flies in the face of the public
interest, because it requires the demolition of streets and other rights-of-
way to lay down a duplicative network. The ILECs have used their
65
resources to fight their section 251 obligations.
[T]he very success of the BOCs' section 251 strategy has weakened
their offensive posture in securing section 271 authorization to provide
in-region interLATA carriage .... ITlhe BOCs must now decide
whether they would rather continue to repel interconnection and
unbundled access under section 251, or whether they [would] like to
puncture the long-distance firewall after a decade and a half of
restrictions under the MFJ and section 271 of the 1996 Act.
66
If Congress passes H.R. 1542, 67 BOCs will not have to make this choice.
They may fight their interconnection obligations without fear of losing
access to the lucrative interLATA market, removing their incentive to
54. Id. § 251(b)(1).
55. Id. § 251(b)(2).
56. Id. § 251(b)(3).
57. Id. § 251(b)(4).
58. Id. § 251(b)(5).
59. Id. §251(c).
60. Id. § 251(c)(2).
61. Id. § 251(c)(3).
62. Id. § 251(c)(4).
63. Id. § 251(c)(6).
64. Chen, supra note 37, at 1538.
65. Id. ("Chronic litigation over section 251, however, has taught aspiring CLECs not to
wait.").
66. Id. at 1577.
67. For further discussion of H.R. 1542, see infra Part V.
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provide access to their competitors, and thereby harming consumers.
C. Section 271
According to the FCC, the agency charged with implementing the
1996 Act, "[alt its core, Section 271 is a simple yet clever proposition: in
exchange for opening their local facilities to competitors, the 1996 Act
provides the BOCs with the substantial reward of the long distance
'carrot.' 68 Unlike the MFJ, the 1996 Act permits a BOC to provide
interLATA service. 69 This "incentive of long-distance entry [draws] the
BOCs into cooperating with local exchange competitors., 70 As discussed in
Parts VI(A) and VII(C) of this Note, section 271's incentives are working
as well as can be expected against an industry segment hostile to giving up
its monopoly position.7' After the passage of the 1996 Act, consumers saw
faster deployment of new local service technologies, while prices for those
technologies fell dramatically. This budding competition, however, is still
too fragile to remove the BOC's incentives to comply with section 251's
provisions.
Currently, to receive relief from the interLATA line-of-business
restrictions first imposed on it by the MFJ, a BOC must apply to the
Commission for relief on a state-by-state basis.72 The Commission then has
ninety days to render a decision.73 The Commission will not grant relief
from the LATA restrictions unless a BOC satisfies four general conditions,
described in the following sections. 74
1. Track A or Track B
To satisfy the first condition, the BOC must have provided CLECs
with access and interconnection to its networks in accordance with section
251 of the 1996 Act, or it must not have received any requests for such
68. H.R. 1686 - The "Internet Freedom Act" and H.R. 1685 - The "Internet Growth
and Development Act": Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) (Statement of William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC) [hereinafter Kennard
Statement], available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kenn0718.htm (last visited Mar.
29, 2001).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. IV 1998).
70. The 1996 Telecom Act: An Antitrust Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Bus. Rights, and Competition of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
17 (1997) (statement of Reed E. Hundt).
71. See Communications Industry Offers Wish List of Telecom Act Changes, COMM.
DAILY, Feb. 8, 2001.
72. 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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access or interconnection." If the BOC application fits into the formerapphcatlon if it fit h
category, the application is called a 'Track A" application i its the
latter classification, the Commission refers to it as a "Track B"
application.77 The two-track system avoids penalizing those BOCs who
have not yet received requests from competitors, despite their compliance
with section 251.78
2. The 14-Point Checklist
To satisfy the second requirement for general interLATA relief, the
BOC must adequately fulfill the 14-point competitive checklist set forth in
section 271. 79 The 14-point checklist addresses separate pieces of the
market-opening provisions set out in sections 251 and 252 of the 1996
Act.80 A BOC cannot fulfill the checklist unless it shows that it has
complied with all of the various aspects of the market-opening
requirements outlined in sections 251 and 252.
3. Separate Affiliate
The third condition requires the BOC to establish a separate affiliate
to provide its interLATA services.8' This separate affiliate must meet
"certain structural requirements and nondiscrimination safeguards."'82 This
requirement seeks to ensure that the cross-subsidization problems that
formed part of the impetus for the divestiture of AT&T do not recur.
4. The Public Interest, Convenience, and Necessity
The final requirement for interLATA relief requires the BOC to show
75. Id. § 271(c)(1) ("A Bell operating company meets the requirements of this
paragraph if it meets the requirements of subparagraph (A) or subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph for each State for which the application is sought.").
76. Mandy, supra note 5, at 323. See also 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A).
77. Mandy, supra note 5, at 323. See also 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(B).
78. Section 271 provides recourse if a BOC whose application was approved via 'Track
B" turns out to rebuff the provisions of section 251 when a request for interconnection does
materialize. This provision allows the Commission to revoke any prior approval of a section
271 application if it finds that the applicant no longer satisfies the conditions of section
271(c).
If at any time after the approval of an application under paragraph (3), the
Commission determines that a Bell operating company has ceased to meet any of
the conditions required for such approval, the Commission may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing-.. . (iii) suspend or revoke such approval.
47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).
79. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B).
80. Id.
81. Id. §§ 271(d)(3)(B), 272.
82. Mandy, supra note 5, at 323. See also 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).
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that its provision of interLATA service is "consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity.
' '83
IV. THE "DIGITAL DIVIDE"
The problem of the "digital divide," as Representative Tauzin
eloquently overstated, is:
[Those living in areas that are not near POPs, or that are not tied into a
backbone facility via a gathering line are being disenfranchised of the
fruits of our new economy. Without a high-speed connection to the
Internet backbone, these Americans in our rural areas and inner-cities
are relegated to a Narrowband Dirt Road that is so incompatible with
the rest of our high-speed infrastructure that the flow of
communications across our national web-based infrastructures will be
significantly impeded.... If we all do not operate at high-speeds [sic],
then the Internet cannot evolve into the fluid, nation-wide
communications network that all of us are hoping it will be.... So, we
have this digital divide in the U.S. because many people don't have
access to backbone, because of where they live, and the dial-up access
that. theY4 are limited to affords them only narrowband Internet
services.
Although Representative Tauzin may have overstated the problem in
support of his bill, the dilemma of the digital divide is real. "America,
including rural America, runs on telecommunications networks as it once
ran on rails."85 Unfortunately, rural areas and inner cities continue to lag
86behind the national average for online access. Even when controlling for
differences in income, rural areas remain far behind the national average.7
"These populations are among those, for example, that could most use
electronic services to find jobs, housing, or other services. '"" Despite the
incredible speed of broadband deployment, some markets in rural and
83. 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C).
84. H.R. 1686-The "Internet Freedom Act" and H.R. 1685-The "Internet Growth
and Development Act": Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of Rep. W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Telecomms.,
Trade, and Consumer Prot.) [hereinafter Tauzin Statement], available at http:lwww.
house.gov/judiciary/tauz07l8.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2001). Rep. Tauzin refers to "POPs"
in his statement. A POP, or Point of Presence, "is the place your long distance carrier, called
an IntereXchange Carrier (IXC), terminates your long distance lines just before those lines
are connected to your local phone company's lines or to your own direct hookup. Each IXC
can have multiple POPs within one LATA." NEWTON, supra note 17, at 692.
85. Bob Rowe, Strategies to Promote Advanced Telecommunications Capabilities, 52
FED. COMM. L.J. 381, 393 (1999).
86. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FALLING
THROUGH THE NET II: NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/net2/falling.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2001).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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insular America remain shut out of this "revolution."89 Overall, however,
the divide is closing. In data released by the FCC at the close of 2000,
"Ithe number of sparsely populated zip codes with high-speed subscribers
increased by 69% during the first half of the year [2000], compared to an
increase of 4% for the most densely populated zip codes." 90
V. H.R. 1542: INTERNET FREEDOM AND BROADBAND
DEPLOYMENT ACT OF 2001
H.R. 1542, the "Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of
2001," was introduced to the House of Representatives on April 24, 2001,
in large part to "bridge" the "digital divide."9' As discussed in Part I of this
Note, H.R. 1542 took the place of H.R. 2420, which died with the close of
the 106th Congress.92 With the start of the 107th Congress, Representative
89. Much of the problem of the digital divide does not lie with the lack of high-speed
Internet access in rural and insular areas, but with the lack of any Internet access or even
computer at all. In fact, as of 1997, only 14.8% of the rural population and 17.3% of the
central city population had Internet access of any kind. Id. In addition, only 34.9% of the
rural population and 32.8% of the central city population had a personal computer. Id.
Clumsily rushing to get high-speed Internet access to communities without computers may
put the cart before the horse.
90. News Release, FCC, Federal Communications Commission Releases Data on High-
Speed Services for Internet Access (Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://www.fcc.govl
Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State Link/IAD/hspdl000.pdf. See id at tbl. 8.
91. Hearing on H., 1542, supra note 4 ("broadband deployment is almost nonexistent
in most of the rural areas of our country.... Areas in which broadband services are not
available are in jeopardy. They are in jeopardy of being left out of the new Internet age.")
(statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin). "This provision is essential to assure adequate internet
backbone services in many rural areas of the nation ...." Id. (statement of Rep. Rick
Boucher). "[Tihis bill has the one hook that I think will get its undeserved support, and that
hook is the promise that rural areas will magically receive access to advanced data services
if we pass the bill." Id. (statement of Rep. Anna Eshoo).
Indeed many do support the bill in the hopes that it will address the "digital divide"
that exists in their district and in rural and insular areas throughout the country. "My goal in
supporting this bill is to provide access and choice to all Americans, regardless of where
they live, to have the same access in rural areas as they do-as those that live in large
metropolitan areas." Id. (statement of Rep. Steve Buyer). "I am too concerned about the
digital divide in my district, and I believe that this legislation will help close that digital
divide." Id. (statement of Rep. Eliot Engel).
This intent was manifested in hearings on the identical H.R. 2420 during the 106th
Congress as well. H.R. 2420: The Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of
1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. Trade & Consumer Prot., 106th Cong.
22 (2000) [hereinafter Hearing on H.P. 2420] (prepared statement of James D. Ellis, Senior
Executive Vice President and General Counsel of SBC Communications, Inc.) ("HR
2420... is a major step in the right direction to correct the imbalance in regulation and
close the 'digital divide."'). "I understand that H.R. 2420 is being touted as a solution to the
rural digital divide." Id at 34 (prepared statement of Dhruv Khanna, Executive Vice
President and General Counsel, Covad Communications).
92. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Tauzin has taken over as Chairman of the House Commerce Committee,
after the retirement of the former Chairman Representative Thomas
Bliley.93 In his position as Chairman, and "probably the most powerful
supporter of the nation's 'competitive' carriers," Representative Bliley
made sure that Representative Tauzin's bill was never introduced on the
House floor.94 Prior to the close of the 106th Congress, Representative
Tauzin had gathered support for H.R. 2420 from 224 cosponsors,95 making
it likely that H.R. 1542 will pass the House this term, with Representative
Tauzin as Chairman of the House Commerce Committee.96
H.R. 1542 modifies section 271 of the 1996 Act to include data
services within the definition of "incidental services" mentioned in 47
U.S.C. § 271(g),97 and sets out various terms to deregulate the provision of
data services by ILECs.98 Currently, section 271 does not distinguish
between voice and data service in its restriction on BOCs.99 It does allow
for the provision of interLATA service, however, when used for a purpose
falling within the definition of an "incidental interLATA service. ' 0 H.R.
1542 seeks to include the broad category of data services among the narrow
categories already delineated in section 271. Although other bills exist that
seek to grant similar relief to BOCs,' °' this Note focuses on H.R. 1542
93. David McGuire, Bells, Rivals Gear Up for Battle, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2001, at
G13 (noting that retiring Representative Thomas J. Bliley, former Chairman of the
Commerce Committee, blocked H.R. 2420's consideration by the full committee during the
106th Congress, despite the bill's strong support in the House).
94. Id.
95. Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, H.R. 2420, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl06query.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2001). H.R. 1542 had 78
cosponsors as of its introduction in the House. Bill Summary & Status for the 107th
Congress, H.R. 1542, at http:llthomas.loc.govlbssfdlO7query.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2001).
96. McGuire, supra note 93. Some feel that Rep. Tauzin is pushing this bill too hard,
too fast. The bill was (re)introduced April 24, 2001, went to a full committee hearing April
25, 2001, and moved to markup in the Telecommunications Subcommittee on April 26,
2001, the day this issue went to press. "Rep. Cox (R-Cal.) said members were being
'deprived of the opportunity to think.' Rep. Markey (D-Mass.) said going to markup day
[sic] after hearing was 'disrespectful of the issues at stake,' and promised to offer multiple
amendments." Bell Deregulation Bill Seen Clearing Telecom Panel Today, COMM. DAILY,
Apr. 26, 2001.
97. Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001, H.R. 1542, 107th Cong.
§ 6 (2001).
98. Id. § 4.
99. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. IV 1998).
100. Id. § 271(g). Incidental interLATA services mainly deal with audio and video
programming to subscribers, alarm monitoring services, Internet services to elementary and
secondary schools, and signaling information. Id.
101. Perhaps the most notable initiatives include H.R. 1685 and H.R. 1686 from the
106th Congress and the Broadband Internet Access Act of 2001 (H.R. 267 and S. 88) from
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because its predecessor enjoyed substantial bipartisan support in the House,
it was sponsored by the current Chairman of the influential House
Commerce Committee, and, therefore, it appears likely to pass the
House.102
VI. CURRENT ALTERNATIVES TO CHANGING THE LAW
H.R. 1542 nullifies much, if not all, of the incentive the 1996 Act
created for BOCs to open their markets to competition. The question
remains whether extreme measures such as those proposed in H.R. 1542
are necessary to achieve the commendable objective of providing rural and
insular areas with greater opportunities for high-speed Internet access. As
stated in the hearings on H.R. 1542's predecessor, H.R. 2420, "[p]erhaps
most telling is the fact that, if there is a problem here, it can be addressed
far more narrowly than by legislation that rejects the incentive-based
framework of the 1996 Act."' 03 This Note suggests that the government
needs no additional law to achieve the goal of increased high-speed Internet
access for rural communities.
Section 271, as written, provides interLATA data (and voice) relief to
BOCs. The section simply requires that BOCs comply with the law as set
forth in sections 251 and 252. Notwithstanding sections 251 and 252,
however, the FCC has provided a mechanism for BOCs to receive targeted
interLATA relief for data services provided to rural areas.'0 4 These two
methods provide BOCs with interLATA data relief, just as H.R. 1542 does,
without removing the competitive incentives of the 1996 Act. InterLATA
relief for the provision of data services, however, is not the only way to
provide high-speed Internet access to rural and insular areas. Other
technologies provide means for high-speed Internet access as well.
A. Section 271
Unlike in the days before the 1996 Act, BOCs currently have the
means to provide both voice and data interLATA services. By satisfying
the requirements of section 271, a BOC may gain access to the long-
the 107th Congress.
102. "Lobbyists on other side [sic] also were fairly resigned to bill's passage. 'We're
expecting that it's going to pass,' ALTS Pres. John Windhausen said . . . ." Bell
Deregulation Bill Seen Clearing Telecom Panel Today, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 26, 2001. Bill
Summary & Status for the 106th Congress, H.R. 2420, at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss
dl06query.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2001). This bill had more than one hundred
cosponsors from each major party. Id.
103. Hearing on H.R. 2420, supra note 91, at 43 (prepared statement of Len Cali, Vice
President, Federal Government Affairs, AT&T).
104. LATA Relief Order, supra note 13.
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distance market.'05 If a BOC decides that it can prove to the Commission
that it has successfully complied with the competitive provisions of the
1996 Act, it may apply for the right to provide all interLATA services.' 6
The Commission must render a decision on any section 271 application
within 90 days.' °7 Thus, "this legislation is unnecessary because, under
current law, the BOCs themselves hold the key to obtaining the authority to
provide any long distance service by opening their local markets to
competitors."'0 8
If Congress simply leaves the law as it currently stands, BOCs
maintain the power to quickly obtain access to the lucrative long-distance
market, while Congress assures that the market-opening provisions of the
1996 Act will not be sacrificed unnecessarily. Two BOCs have already
benefited under section 271 in the past 18 months.'09 The FCC approved
section 271 applications for both Verizon in New York and Massachusetts
and SBC in Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma."0 In approving their
applications, the Commission decided that these companies had earned the
right to provide long-distance service.
B. Application for LATA Boundary Modification or Waiver
BOCs argue that section 706 of the 1996 Act requires that the
Commission eliminate LATA restrictions in order to "encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans.""' In the Advanced
Services Order, the FCC rejected this contention." 2 In that Order, however,
the FCC went on to discuss the possible need for LATA boundary
modifications to ensure that rural and underserved customers received
105. 47 U.S.C. § 271(c), (d).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 271(c)(3).
108. Hearing on H.R. 2420, supra note 91, at 42 (prepared statement of Len Cali, Vice
President, Federal Government Affairs, AT&T).
109. See FCC, Section 271 Applications, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common-
Carrier/in-regionapplications (last visited Apr. 26, 2001) (listing BOCs' 271 applications
and their corresponding regions). Verizon has an application currently pending before the
FCC to provide interLATA service in Connecticut and SBC has filed an application to gain
271 approval for Missouri. Id
110. Id.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a). The quote continues: "(including, in particular, elementary and
secondary schools and classrooms)." Id. Significantly, section 271 already contains an
exception to the LATA restrictions to allow BOCs to provide Internet access to elementary
and secondary schools. Id. § 271(g)(2).
112. Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability,
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011,
24,049-50, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1998).
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high-speed Internet access.
Then, in its LATA Relief Order, the FCC directly addressed this
question." 3 The Commission determined that it would make boundary
modifications to LATAs and waive LATA restrictions in cases where a
two-prong test was met.14 The first prong requires that "the LATA
boundary modification be necessary to encourage the deployment of
advanced services on a reasonable and timely basis to all Americans."" 5
The second prong of the test requires that the Commission decide that the
types and degree of services that BOC claims to provide would not
"remove its incentive to apply for permission to provide other interLATA
service under section 271.,,16
In the LATA Relief Order, the FCC specifically addressed the same
problem that H.R. 1542 seeks to address, but did so in a much more
tailored manner. Indeed, the Order states:
[W]e reiterate that any relief we may grant to ensure that all Americans
receive the benefits of advanced services will be narrowly tailored. We
do not intend, by granting any LATA modification, to enable a BOC
(or its affiliate) to provide full Internet backbone or other broadband
infrastructure services either within a state or across multiple states.
For the Commission to allow a BOC to provide backbone services to
the public prior to the BOC's being granted permission to provide
interLATA services pursuant to section 271 could greatly diminish the
BOC's incentive to seek 271 relief."
7
Thus, the Commission recognized that providing wholesale interLATA
relief would remove the incentive for BOCs to comply with the competitive
provisions of the 1996 Act, and it tailored the interLATA relief to narrowly
address the stated problem.
The Commission's LATA Relief Order provides a mechanism to
address the digital divide. "[Tio the extent that there may be instances
where a LATA boundary is standing in the way of consumers getting
broadband services from BOCs, the Commission has set up a LATA
boundary modification process."" 8 If a BOC wanted to provide high-speed
Internet access to a rural or insular area that did not have this type of
service, it merely must file an application with the Commission. Despite
the Commission's solution to the very problem H.R. 1542 purports to
113. LATA Relief Order, supra note 13.
114. Id.
115. Id. para. 16.
116. Id.
117. Id. para. 26.
118. Kennard Statement, supra note 68.
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solve, no BOC has applied for this type of relief."9
The simple reason why rural customers, and other customers in
unserved and underserved areas, are not yet being served as
robustly as we would like is not caused by legal impediments.
Rather it is largely about simple economics. Providing customers
with sophisticated services in areas of low density is an
expensive undertaking.
20
BOCs are not rushing to apply for the right to serve rural areas because
those areas simply do not yield substantial profits. Despite this inaction,
BOCs lobbied hard for the passage of H.R. 2420 and continue to lobby for
its successor, H.R. 1542, a bill that encompasses within its purpose the very
same intention of the ignored LATA Relief Order.2
C. Other Technologies
Legislation and administrative law are not the only means to address
the problem of the digital divide. As has happened in many areas of the
law, technology has foiled the best legal intentions. In this case, however,
"competition among technologies as well as providers"'22 has proven to be
an alternate solution to the problem of the "digital divide." As
Representative Anna Eshoo stated at hearings on H.R. 1685 and H.R. 1686
last summer: "The so-called 'incentives' for RBOCs to roll out DSL are
unnecessary because clearly there are signals that competition already
exists in this market. Cable companies have two-way high speed cable
technology to potentially compete with RBOCs.'
' 3
Cable companies do not pose the only competition for LECs in
providing high-speed Internet access, however. "Wireless technologies-
both terrestrial and satellite-are also on the scene. High-speed Internet
service via satellite is available today virtually everywhere in the United
States, including rural areas."' 24 Thus, as Representative Eshoo and former
Chairman Kennard have rightfully pointed out, LECs do not constitute the
only source of high-speed Internet access for rural areas.
Section 271, the LATA Relief Order, and alternate technologies all
119. See Network Servs. Div., Local Access and Transport Areas (LATA) Issues, at
http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/nsd/documents/LATA.HTML (last visited Mar. 31, 2001).
120. Kennard Statement, supra note 68.
121. Hearings on H.R. 1542, supra note 4.
122. Id.
123. H.R. 1686-The "Internet Freedom Act" and H.R. 1685-The "Internet Growth
and Development Act": Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Rep. Anna G. Eshoo) [hereinafter Eshoo Statement], available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/esho0718.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
124. Kennard Statement, supra note 68.
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demonstrate ways that the current law and technology address the digital
divide. These alternate solutions render legislation like H.R. 1542
unnecessary, and, if such legislation is passed, it will harm the consumers
in rural and urban areas alike.
VII. WORKING THE SYSTEM: WHY H.R. 1542 Is HARMFUL TO
CONSUMERS
Despite the fact that they have shown no interest in addressing the
problem of the digital divide, BOCs lobbied hard for the passage of H.R.
2420, and continue to show their staunch support for H.R. 1542, although
addressing the problem of the digital divide is the stated purpose of H.R.
1542. This apparent paradox can be solved by examining the past behavior
of BOCs.
According to the chairman of the FCC, the Commission has already
proposed a compromise with the BOCs that would allow them to
provide essentially unregulated data services through a subsidiary, but
the BOCs have refused this compromise in anticipation that their
lobbyists can produce a better result through legislation that effectively
circumvents the requirement of section 271 of the 1996 Act.1
25
For BOCs, H.R. 2420 embodied the legislation for which they had been
waiting. Without regard to the purpose of the bill, BOCs strongly supported
H.R. 2420, and continue to support H.R. 1542, because it provides them
with wholesale interLATA relief for data services.
A. Such Legislation Is Not Tailored to the Problem of the Digital
Divide
H.R. 1542 is not designed to truly address the digital divide. As one
witness noted in hearings on H.R. 2420 last summer: "Nor is this bill
directed at promoting broadband deployment in rural areas. Make no
mistake-H.R. 2420 is a direct blow to broadband entrants .... [1]t will
not help most rural areas.' 26 Congress maintains the unrealistic hope that
the incentive of interLATA relief for data services will bring BOCs
streaming into the rural and neglected low-income urban markets. This type
of legislation "does not guarantee the deployment of advanced services
anywhere. Congress should address broadband deployment to rural and
urban areas directly and in a competitively and technologically neutral
125. Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal Government Created
Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1, 81-82 (1999).
126. Hearing on H.R. 2420, supra note 91, at 32-33 (prepared statement of Dhruv
Khanna, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Covad Communications). Covad is
a CLEC providing DSL access. Id.
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way-not by removing the Bells' incentives to open their local markets.' ' 7
B. InterLATA Relieffor Data Services Is No Small Prize
BOC support for H.R. 2420 and H.R. 1542 does not stem from a deep
desire to enter low-income and isolated areas; it originates instead from the
call of the lucrative interLATA data services market. Although in the past
voice services have constituted the majority of traffic over the long-
distance networks, current technology has changed the environment to
bring data services to the forefront. "[C]urrently, the majority of traffic
traveling over long haul networks is data traffic, not voice, and analysts
predict that data traffic will make up 90 percent of all traffic within four
years. ,2 8
Because of data service's burgeoning role in the long-distance
economy, granting interLATA relief for data services alone no longer
represents an insignificant concession. "In a world where data is
experiencing explosive growth and is rapidly outpacing voice traffic,
allowing the BOCs to carry long distance data traffic before they have
satisfied the requirements of Section 271 would severely undermine the
BOCs' incentive to open their markets."'
2 9
Technology presents a further glitch in the "data-doesn't-mean-much-
anyway" argument. Technological advances are quickly rendering the
data/voice distinction insignificant. "[S]ince voice traffic can readily be
'packetized' or converted to data traffic, an exemption for data is an
exemption for voice."3 Thus, if Congress passes H.R. 1542, BOCs could
convert voice traffic to a packet-switched network. This would mean that
traditional voice long distance would be converted into a data service,
potentially allowing BOCs to circumvent the entirety of section 271's
interLATA restrictions.
127. Letter from NARUC to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee
(May 11, 2000).
128. Hearing on H.R. 2420, supra note 91, at 42 (prepared statement of Len Cali, Vice
President, Federal Government Affairs, AT&T). See also Kennard Statement, supra note 68.
129. Kennard Statement, supra note 68.
130. H.R. 1686 - The "Internet Freedom Act" and H.R. 1685 - The "Internet Growth
and Development Act": Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of Randall B. Lowe, Executive Vice President and Chief Legal Officer,
Prism Communications Services, Inc.), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary
lowe07l8.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). Criticism of H.R. 1542 on this basis was clear in
recent hearings: "Unfortunately, as I look at the bill I have to conclude that it is a sham.
You cannot separate digital-you cannot separate voice from data. If you cannot separate
voice from data, how can you have data relief?" Hearing on H.R. 1542, supra note 4
(statement of Rep. Charles Pickering).
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C. The Technological Environment Prior to the 1996 Act
The passage of H.R. 1542 would result in grievous setbacks for
consumers best illustrated by the technological environment before the
1996 Act, a time when the BOCs enjoyed a local exchange service
monopoly. "It's important to note that the Bells had DSL technology but
did not offer it. Instead, they offered the more expensive 'T-1' lines to
businesses. 13' "[Incumbents were selectively deploying only one form of
DSL-called HDSL-and charging businesses upwards of $1000 to $1500
per month for this 'TI' service."'32 The ILECs offered the significantly
more expensive T1 service, despite the fact that "DSL technology has
existed for more than 10 years." The ILECs' lackadaisical attitude toward
the roll-out of fast, inexpensive technology changed dramatically with the
introduction of competition into the local exchange market. "[S]purred by
this growing broadband competition, the incumbent carriers have
responded with their own burgeoning DSL deployment.' 34 The provision
of DSL service "now appears to be driven by the threat of competition."'
35
This competition has not only induced ILECs to deploy DSL, and to do it
faster, "but where competition exists, it is also forcing the incumbent
carriers to reduce their DSL charges to consumers.' 36
D. H.R. 1542 Undermines the "Delicate Balance" of the 1996 Act: It
Is Too Soon for Total Deregulation of Data Services
The preamble to the 1996 Act proclaims that it alms to "promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and
higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies.' 37 Many BOC proponents hitch their arguments to the
"reduce regulation" language in this preamble. In truth, this preamble
actually sets out the "delicate balance" that the 1996 Act achieved between
the competing interests and benefits derived from less regulation and more
131. Eshoo Statement, supra note 123.
132. Hearing on H.R. 2420, supra note 91, at 33 (prepared statement of Dhruv Khanna,
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Covad Communications).
133. Hearing on H.R. 2420, supra note 91, at 41 (prepared statement of Len Cali, Vice
President, Federal Government Affairs, AT&T).
134. Id.
135. Bickerstaff, supra note 125, at 76.
136. Hearing on H.R. 2420, supra note 91, at 41 (prepared statement of Len Cali, Vice
President, Federal Government Affairs, AT&T).
137. Preamble to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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competition."'
Competition in the local market has taken great strides in the five
years since the enactment of the 1996 Act, but "[d]espite all regulatory
hope, meaningful local competition has not yet emerged, and [there is] no
point in coddling the BOCs until it does."'139 As Senator Hollings said in the
days leading up to the enactment of the 1996 Act: "[t]elecommunications
services should be deregulated after, not before, markets become
competitive.' 40 Deregulating telecommunications services before the
market has become competitive, however, is exactly what H.R. 1542 sets
out to do. "Competition is still too nascent to abandon the pro-competitive
elements of the Act.'
14
'
The 1996 Act corrected for the possibility of a premature deregulation
of the telecommunications market through section 271. Only when a BOC
has shown that it has taken every step required to open its markets to
competition will the Commission lift its LATA restrictions. The strategy
encompassed in H.R. 1542 destroys competition by tipping the balance in
favor of deregulation. As former Chairman Kennard stated:
I am sure that increased competition is the well-meant intention of the
proposed legislation. Inadvertently, however, I believe this legislation
will not only upset the balance struck by the 1996 Act, but it actually
would reverse the progress attained by the 1996 Act. In an effort to
move us forward, this bill mistakenly moves us backward. 142
E. The False Premise that H.R. 1542 Amends the 1996 Act to
Account for the Internet
Some proponents of H.R. 1542 argue that the competitive provisions
of the 1996 Act did not contemplate the Internet, and H.R. 1542 merely
amends the 1996 Act to account for the Internet's impact on
telecommunications policy. 143 Despite these contentions, however, section
138. Kennard Statement, supra note 68 ("The genius of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (1996 Act) is the delicate balance it strikes between regulation and deregulation to
achieve competition in all forms of communications, and to deploy the fruits of that
competition to all of the American people.").
139. Chen, supra note 37, at 1579. Chen, once a proponent of this sort of deregulation,
acknowledged his change of heart by saying "[wirite today, regret tomorrow, renounce
mafiana." Id. at 1580.
140. 142 CONG. REc. 2010 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
141. H.R. 1686-The "Internet Freedom Act" and H.R. 1685-The "Internet Growth
and Development Act": Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Glenn Ivey, Chairman, Maryland Public Service Commission and
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners ("NARUC") representative),
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/ivey07l8.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001).
142. Kennard Statement, supra note 68.
143. Tauzin Statement, supra note 84 (stating "[In] 1995, the year we spent crafting the
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271 did contemplate the Internet. Section 271(g)(2) of the 1996 Act
provides an exception to the interLATA restriction for "Internet services
over dedicated facilities to or for elementary and secondary schools."
144
Congress clearly contemplated that interLATA services could be used to
provide Internet access, and created an exception in section 271(g)(2) to
assure Internet access to schools. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius145-
any argument claiming that the additional exceptions contained in H.R.
1542 are necessary to encompass the advent of the Internet is misplaced.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the digital divide remains a worthy concern, H.R. 1542 does
not bridge this gap. The removal of interLATA data restrictions from
BOCs will not provide an incentive for them to enter the underserved rural
and insular markets, but will only allow them to move unfettered into the
interLATA markets of any region they consider profitable. The rural and
insular markets H.R. 1542 sets out to benefit do not correspond to the
profitable markets likely to lure BOCs if they receive generalized
interLATA relief for data services. Because of the ability to packetize voice
traffic, BOCs would gain unfettered access to all components of the
lucrative long-distance market after the passage of H.R. 1542, despite its
"data-only" restriction. Allowing interLATA data (and, essentially, voice)
relief without requiring a showing that a BOC has opened its local markets
to competition to the satisfaction of the FCC would remove the core of the
1996 Act.
Without the ability to interconnect to BOCs' networks, gain access to
UNEs, and resell services, CLECs would not be able to compete. Creating
a telecommunications network from scratch would be the only option
available to CLECs; however, the related insurmountable economic and
public policy barriers to entry would assure the CLECs' demise. The loss
of competition in the local exchange market through legislation such as
H.R. 1542 will harm consumers by raising prices and eliminating choices.
Congress must realize that the good intentions of such legislation will only
lead Congress and its constituents down the path to the remonopolization of
the local exchange market.
legislation that would become the Act[,] ... [t]he Internet was not on our radar screen ....
In light of this, I do not propose re-opening the Act. Rather, I feel that it must be updated.").
144. 47 U.S.C. § 271(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
145. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 432 (2d ed. 1995)
("[To include or express one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the
alternative.").
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